Royal Engineers and Operation Market Garden (1944)

Introduction

The Supreme Allied Commander, the American General Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969), favoured a general advance of Allied troops towards the Rhine along the whole front. However, the British commander and mastermind behind the successful invasion, Field Marshal Montgomery (1887-1976), favoured a single powerful, narrow, deep thrust across the river obstacles in north Germany and once on German territory to then sweep south to destroy the German industrial base in the Rhur.

It was the latter plan that the Supreme Allied Commander finally choose and it was given the code name 'Market Garden' (17-27 September 1944).

Operation Market Garden
The Plan and Preparations

The Plan

Plan overview - The plan was to use airborne forces to seize crossings over the three major rivers in the Netherlands, namely the Neder Rijn (Lower Rhine), the Waal and the Maas (known by the French and Belgians as the River Meuse) referred to as Operation Market, and then to push forward armoured columns to link up with the airborne troops (see Map 1 below), referred to as Operation Garden. The capture of the bridges and surrounding ground would provide a good bridgehead for an invasion of northern Germany.

All the troops for the operations were under the command of Second British Army (Dempsey). The airborne troops under Airborne Corps (Browning), consisted of 1st British Airborne Division (Urquhart), which was assigned the capture of the bridges over the Neder Rijn at Arnhem. The 82nd US Airborne Division (Gavin) was destined to seize the bridges over the River Waal about Grave and Nijmegen, and the 101st US Airborne Division (Taylor) responsible for securing the crossings over all obstacles on the line of advance of XXX Corps south of Grave (see Map 1 above).

Airborne engineer objectives - The primary objective of the airborne engineers accompanying the 1st British Airborne Division was to remove demolition charges from the captured bridges. It was also planned that the American 878th Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion would be flown in to construct a forward fighter strip in the Arnhem area, this part of the plan was never carried out.

Ground troops plan - The main thrust on the ground was entrusted to XXX Corps (Horrocks) consisting of Guards Armoured, 43rd (Wessex) and 50th (Northumbrian) Divisions. Their start point was the de Groote Barrier bridgehead on the border between the Netherlands and Belgium, centred around the Belgian town of Bourg Leopold (also called Leopoldsburg - approximately 30 miles south of Eindhoven, Netherlands). The advance was to be led by the Guards Armoured Division while the 43rd Division was, in the event of the Guards being held up by demolitions on any of the river lines, to carry out assault crossings and start bridging. 50th Division was to remain to guard the de Groote Barrier bridgehead and to be ready to move forward to Arnhem when called on.

XXX Corps was to be supported by VIII Corps (O'Connor) consisting of 11th Armoured and 3rd Infantry Divisions on its right flank and XII Corps (Richie) consisting of 7th Armoured, 15th (Scottish) and 53rd (Welsh) Divisions with 4th Armoured Brigade (Carver) on its left flank.

Most of the fighting airborne troops were to land on D and D+1 day and the remainder of the divisions on D+2. As soon as airstrips were available 52nd (Lowlands) Division, which was air portable, was to be flown in north of Arnhem. D Day was fixed for 17th September 1944.

Ground assault preparation - Engineer support and planned bridging responsibilities

Army, Corps and Divisional Engineer support - The engineer and associated support units attached to XXX Corps were:

• Guards Armoured Division, which led the ground advance
  • 11th Field Company RE from XXX Corps Troops RE
  • Reconnaissance parties of 16th Airfield Construction Group RE
  • Detachments 5357th Airfield Construction Wing RAF
  • Detachments 128th (Bridge) Company RASC
  • Guards Armoured Division Postal Unit RE

• 43rd (Wessex) Division
  • Platoon of 210th Field Company RE
  • XXX Corps Troops RE (under command for movement)
  • 7th Army Troop RE
  • 23rd Mechanical Equipment Platoon RE
  • 16th Airfield Construction Group RE
  • 5357th Airfield Construction Wing RAF
  • 43rd (Wessex) Division Postal Unit RE

Anticipated bridging responsibilities - The main responsibility for bridging was vested in a special force under command of Brigadier BC Davey, Chief Engineer (CE) XXX Corps. It was estimated that in case of demolitions the following bridges would have to be built over the various major obstacles:

• River Maas (800 ft. wide) - initially three Class 40 rafts, a Class 9 FBE and a Class 40 Bailey Pontoon bridge followed by a Class 40 Bailey barge bridge.
• Maas-Waal Canal - a Class 40 Bailey pontoon bridge followed by another of the same type.
• River Waal (850 ft. wide) - initially nine Class 40 rafts, two Class 40 Bailey bridges, one on pontoons and one on barges.
• Neder Rijn (300 ft. wide at this time of year) - initially one Class 9 FBE bridge was to be followed by two Class 40 Bailey bridges, one on pontoons and one on barges.

The engineer force to be prepared to carry out this enormous programme of work collected in northern Belgium at Bourg Leopold where a large bridging material depot was established close to the town on a fine expanse of sandy health which provided an excellent area for this depot. The force consisted of:

• H.Q. 10 Army Group RE (Colonel LO Clark)
• H.Q. 11 Army Group RE (Colonel MRHZ Swinhoe)
• H.Q. 1st Canadian Army Group RE
• 6th Army Troops Engineers (Lieutenant Colonel TD Oborne RE)
• 7th Army Troops Engineers (Lieutenant Colonel TI Lloyd RE)
• 8th G.H.Q. Troops Engineers (Lieutenant Colonel GDS Adami RE)
• 15th (Kent) G.H.Q. Troops Engineers (Lieutenant Colonel LRE Fayle RE)
• 1st Canadian Army Troops Engineers (Lieutenant Colonel NI Fraser, RCE)
• 2nd Canadian Army Troops Engineers (Lieutenant Colonel AJ Kerry, RCE)

The bridging equipment and its transport was organized in a number of columns each capable of dealing with one of the waterways which might have to be crossed, and an Army Group RE was nominated to take charge of the bridging on each obstacle, divisional engineers being liable to be placed under the Army Group REs, if required. These arrangements provided flexibility and a speedy response to an ever changing situation. The bridging vehicles were under the command of a Commander Royal Army Service Corps (CRASC) Transport Column who had four RASC bridge companies at his disposal.

In all there were available 9,000 Royal Engineers and Pioneer Corps personnel plus 2,277 vehicles of which over half were RE. Such a large organization, liable to operate dispersed over a considerable area, required special arrangements for communication. This was provided by reinforcements of existing wireless sets by others borrowed from a reserve Army Group Royal Artillery.

The length of the supply chain was also a factor that had to be built into the engineer plans. At the time of Operation Market Garden supply vehicles took 10 days to travel from Normandy to the front and back.

Operation Market
Airborne operation to capture the bridges

On the Sunday morning of 17 September 1944 airborne troops departed from their respective air fields in England and accompanied by fighter escorts were flown to their pre-designated drop zones (DZ) and landing zones (LZ) in the Netherlands.

American Airborne operations (17-20 September 1944)

101st US Airborne Division - The 101st US Airborne Division, which came under XXX Corps after landing, had considerable trouble from anti-aircraft fire on its way to the dropping zones. However, it landed successfully and captured intact the four bridges over the canal at Veghel, but that over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon (Son) was blown by the enemy before it could be seized. A parachute regiment, however, managed to cross the canal from the north and join hands with the advancing XXX Corps.

82nd US Airborne Division - The 82nd US Airborne Division similarly landed successfully along the Maas, captured and held the bridge at Grave intact, then engaged the enemy holding the bridge at Nijmegen till in co-operation with XXX Corps it was captured, also intact, three days later.

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British Dropping and Landing Zones (17-18 September 1944)

The limited aircraft resources dictated that the 1st Airborne Division be flown to Arnhem in two lifts over two days (17 and 18 September). The deployment details of the engineer elements of the force are shown below:

First Lift (17 September) - The lead elements of 1st Airborne Division which included: 1st Parachute Brigade Group, 1st Airlanding Brigade Group, with 1st Parachute Squadron RE and 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE plus the Divisional Tactical Headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel ECW Myers RE, the Commanding Royal Engineer (CRE).

Shortly after take off a glider carrying five NCOs and sixteen Sappers of No 1 Platoon 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE fell apart over the village of Paulton, near Weston-super-Mare killing all occupants. (As standard practise glider troops were not issued with parachutes).

The rest of the air armada crossed the Dutch coast at about 1.30 pm and after seeing the American Dakotas returning from their drops the British made accurate landings about five miles north-east of the centre of Arnhem.

Another member of 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE was killed when the nose wheel assembly of his glider crashed through the floor of the aircraft as it landed.

Once on the ground the units quickly found their way to their respective RVs before setting off to capture the Arnhem road bridge. Each unit had one of three designated routes into Arnhem:

• Leopard - along the Amsterdamsweg (1st Parachute Battalion)
• Tiger - along the Utrechtseweg via Oosterbeek (3rd Parachute Battalion)
• Lion - along the Lower Road via Oosterbeek Laag Station (2nd Parachute Battalion)

Second Lift (18 September) - The Second Lift brought the 4th Parachute Brigade with 4th Parachute Squadron RE and elements of 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE and 261 (Airborne) Field Park Company RE to theatre.

Unfortunately the element of surprise had been lost by the time this Brigade arrived and so both the parachutists and gliders were fired upon as they descended or attempted to land. Due to heavy anti-aircraft fire one stick of 4th Parachute Squadron RE was dropped eight miles beyond the DZ. At the DZ the Squadron's Officer Commander, Major AJM Perkins RE dislocated his shoulder on landing.

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Battle of Arnhem (17-21 September 1944)

1st Parachute Brigade activities (17 - 21 September) - Although none of the aircraft in the First Lift were shot down some gliders failed to arrive having gone down over England and in the North Sea. Unfortunately those gliders contained most of the armoured jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron which, with No 3 Platoon 9th Field Company RE, was to seize the main road bridge by a coup de main. This part of the plan had to be cancelled, but 2nd Parachute Battalion (Frost) with B Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron RE and part of No 2 Platoon, 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE, which had been given the same objective, started out at 3.30 pm and by 8.30 pm, having overcome minor opposition en route, reached the buildings at the north end of the main road bridge. After a short battle, in which the troop of 1st Parachute Squadron RE assisted with flame throwers, the north end of the bridge was secured.

Map 2 - Map showing the British and Polish Dropping Zones (DZ) at Arnhem - 17-21 September 1944
(Source: Great Battles of the British Army as Commemorated in the Sandhurst Companies (1991))

Meanwhile C Company, 2nd Battalion with members of 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE had been detached to seize the railway bridge, only to see it "curl up under their noses" as the Germans fired the charges.

The force which had seized the buildings at the north end of the road bridge at this time, owing to casualties, amounted to only about 400 men of whom about eighty were Sappers of 1st Parachute Squadron RE and of part of No 2 Platoon, 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE.

The 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions were held up when trying to advance into Arnhem by more northerly routes (Leopard and Tiger), and thereby the British force at the bridge in Arnhem was isolated.

In Arnhem some of the Royal Engineers, under Captain EM Mackay RE, were allotted the task of holding the Van Limburg Stirum School (see map 3 below) and another building but had soon to concentrate in the former as the second house was set a blaze by the enemy. HQ Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron RE, under Major DC Murray RE, was allocated the defence of the perimeter in a building about 100 yards to the east of the school. This building was soon over run by the Germans.

The party in the school now amounted to 2 officers (Captain Mackay RE and Lieutenant Denis Simpson RE) and 50 other ranks of whom 7 were wounded, also in the building were some men of the C Company 2nd Battalion and No 9 Platoon 3rd Battalion. Mackay described the school as "a large house consisting of offices; trees and bushes grew right up to the northern face, giving no field of fire in that direction. I did not like it, but set about breaking all the glass from the windows and fortifying it. Ten minutes we were heavily attacked....". The attacks continue for the next three days.

On Tuesday (19th) Lance-Sergeant Stan Halliwell, 1st Parachute Squadron RE, who had been captured by the Germans earlier that morning whilst carrying ammunition to an exposed party of his unit was instructed by them to carry a request to Lieutenant Colonel Frost, during a forthcoming truce, that the British surrender. Halliwell carried the German message to Frost, who refused to surrender. Halliwell didn't risk returning to the German lines as he had promised.

At 3 pm on Wednesday (20th) a German Tiger tank and a 105 mm self-propelled gun appeared at the cross roads just 80 yards away from the school and opened fire.

The first salvo blew away the southern face of the house killing Corporal J Simpson RE and wounding three others, more salvos soon followed forcing the survivors to gather in the cellar. The firing continued slowing destroying the fabric of the building until eventually the whole top of the school had been blown off and the rest of the house was a blaze.

Sapper TH Carpenter, 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE later described the scene at the bridge:

The area around the bridge was becoming a sea of flame. The roar and crackle of flaming buildings and dancing shadows cast by the flames was like looking into Dante's inferno.

On that Wednesday night Lieutenant Donald Hindley RE, 1st Parachute Squadron RE and a party of sappers was sent to clear the fuses of explosive charges from the arches of the bridge, which had been put there by the Germans during the course of the day. The party was accompanied by men from A Company under Lieutenant Jack Grayburn, who was killed when they came under attack. Grayburn was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his part in this raid. Hindley described the the raid as "a nerve-racking experience" as he was "working a few feet away from a large quantity of explosives which could be fired at any moment" He survived the German attack with flesh wounds to his shoulder and face.

In the cellar of the school, which was also a first aid post run by two sapper medical orderlies; Corporal Roberts and Sapper 'Pinky' White, Mackay had only 14 able bodied men (none of whom had slept for over 72 hours), 32 wounded and 5 dead. He decided to evacuate.

The next night (21st) Captain Mackay RE and Lieutenant Simpson RE plus 6 other ranks made their escape in two parties they were soon captured but most of them, by devious means, managed to escape from the Germans and ultimately crossed the river to make their way to meet the advancing troops of XXX Corps.

Arnhem Bridge during the battle of Arnhem - 17-27 Sept 1944 (Photo: unknown)

Arnhem in the aftermath of the battle (Photo: unknown)

Some of the senior Royal Engineer NCOs did not like abandoning the wounded and after the war one of them expressed this opinion about Captain Mackay's actions:

Some of us felt that was the time an officer should have stayed with his men, and I was one of those who stayed with the wounded. It had reached the stage where each individual had to decide whether to stay with his wounded comrades or clear off. I suppose it can be said that Captain Mackay, in getting away to England as he did, took back vital information and that we were facing certain capture. But the majority stayed with the wounded.

4th Parachute Brigade activities (18-20 September) - Meanwhile, on 17th September the 1st Airlanding Brigade remained in the vicinity of the landing areas to guard them for the arrival of 4th Parachute Brigade with 4th Parachute Squadron RE on the 18th.

The arrival of 4th Parachute Brigade was delayed by fog in England and it did not appear till late in the afternoon by which time the situation of 1st Parachute Brigade was serious. The two battalions with the balance of 1st Parachute Squadron RE had suffered heavy casualties and, owing to a breakdown in wireless communication, were somewhat disorganized.

After they had landed the 4th Parachute Brigade, tried to force an entry into Arnhem by a circuitous route to the north, but were similarly stopped by German forces and suffered heavily. During this action 4th Parachute Squadron RE acted as the Brigade's rear guard.

Lieutenant WH Skinner RE (Officer Commanding, 261 (Airborne) Field Park Company RE) was captured. After the battle (20th) he and Captain IC Muir (156 Parachute Battalion) were shot, at or near Renkum, in a prisoner-of-war atrocity.

By the 19th, it was clear that no further ground could be gained in Arnhem and that the bridge could not be fully captured intact. It was decided that it was only possible to hold an area around Oosterbeek and await the arrival of XXX Corps from the south.

During the 4th Parachute Brigade's withdrawal into Oosterbeek, Major AJM Perkins RE, Officer Commanding 4th Parachute Squadron RE was sent ahead to find appropriate routes into the village, which he did.

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Oosterbeek Perimeter defence (20-25 September 1944)

Oosterbeek, a village located on the north bank of the Neder Rijn a couple of miles west of Arnhem, was chosen as a consolidation area for 1 Airborne Division. A defensive perimeter was accordingly formed (see Maps 2 - above and 4 - below) and the Royal Engineer units, along with other troops, were allotted sectors in its defence. (Only a couple of those Royal Engineers engaged in the battle of Arnhem bridge managed to get to Oostebeek). The only connection with the south bank available to British troops was a flying ferry at Heveadorp over the river on the southern edge of the perimeter. This was held by 1st Borders and a detachment of 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE until they were driven out by an attack by the enemy with flame throwers on the afternoon of the 20th. (After the battle Lieutenant Colonel ECW Myers RE admitted that he, along with other senior members of the Division, had failed to grasp the strategic and tactical significance of this crossing point. Had it been held it may have provided an alternative crossing point for reinforcements from XXX Corps which could have lead to the capture of Arnhem - as it turned out it was finally liberated by the 49th (West Riding) Division in April 1945 over 6 months after the battle).

Map 4 - Operation Market Garden: British 1st Airborne Division Perimeter Oosterbeek, 20-26 Sept 1944
German Forces A - Worrowski training Bn B - SS KG Eberwein C - SS NCO School Arnhem D - KG Bruhns E - SS KG Krafft F - SS KG Spinder G - SS KG Moeller H - SS KG Von Allworden I - SS KG Harder J - Breakthrough 25 Sept 44		Allied Troops 1 - 1 Border Regt 2 - Part of 4 Para Sqn RE, 9 Fd Coy RE and 261 Fd Pk Coy RE 3 - Glider pilots 4 - 21 Ind Para Company and part of 4 Para Sqn RE 5 - 7 KOSB 6 - 1 Airborne Reccy Sqn 7 - 156 Para Bn 8 - 10 Para Bn 9 - 2 South Staffs Regt 10 - Lonsdale Force (1, 3 & 11 Para Bns) 11 - Glider pilots 12 - 1 Airlanding Light Regt RA 13 - 1 Airlanding Bde HQ and reserve 14 - 1 Airborne Div HQ and reserve 15 - 4 Para Bde HQ 16 - Reinforcement by 1 Polish Bde on night of 22/23 Sept and by 1 Dorestshire Regt on night of 24/25 Sept 44 17 - Withdrawal on 25/26 Sept 44
Source: Powell G: Men at Arnhem (London, 1976, reprinted 2003)

Some members of 4th Parachute Squadron RE, under Captain Nigel Beaumont-Thomas RE, were allocated a section of the perimeter outside the Ommershof building in front the Independent Company trenches.

There was still no sign of the XXX Corps because they were held up in Nijmegen. The supply position was serious as many of the air drops had fallen into enemy hands owing to the difficulty of locating the new dropping zones from the air. Ammunition and rations were running short. The casualties amongst the Royal Engineer officers and other ranks were heavy.

Arrival of Polish Parachute Brigade (21st - 24th September) - On the afternoon of the 21st the Polish Parachute Brigade dropped on the south side of the river. They had hoped to cross by the Heveadorp ferry, but by this time it had been sunk and the site was in enemy hands. That night (21st/22nd) a party of 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE tried to ferry them across on rafts made out of jeep trailers.

The following night (22nd/23rd) a party of 15 weary Sappers of 4th Parachute Squadron RE and 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE were pulled out of the line to make another attempt to get the Poles across. The only equipment available were six reconnaissance boats, a RAF dinghy and some signal cable. Signal cable was attached, bow to stern to each boat and an effort was thus made to pull two Poles over at a time and then to pull the boats back empty. The signal cable did not stand the strain and broke, so Sappers had to row backwards and forwards bringing one Pole each time. By dawn when ferrying had to stop, 60 Poles had been taken across, the Field Engineer from Divisional RE HQ, Lieutenant DV Storrs RE, had rowed across the river 23 times.

On the night of the 23rd/24th, 204 Field Company RE and Polish Airborne Engineers ferried 200 more Poles and members of the 4th Dorsetshire Regiment (4th Dorsets) to the north bank in assault boats lent by 43rd (Wessex) Division.

Skip to Evacuation 25-26th

Operation Garden
Ground operations to link up with airborne troops

XXX Corps advance to Eindhoven and Nijmegen (17-21 September 1944)

The night (16th) before the thrust north, the XXX Corps Commander, decided that the bridge over the first water obstacle, the Meuse-Escaut Canal (code name: Joe), on the start line was insufficient and ordered that a second bridge be built. During the night of 16th September engineer Corps troops constructed a160ft Double Double Bailey across the canal.

On 17th September at 2.30pm, led by the Guards Armoured Division of XXX Corps and supported by strong artillery and rocket-firing aircraft, the Second Army attacked with the orders that its advance should be 'rapid and violent, without regard to what was happening on the flanks'. XXX Corps advanced about eight miles from the de Groote Barrier bridgehead against opposition that was stronger than had been expected. The advance of Guards Armoured Division continued on the 18th, and by 5 pm contact was made with 101st US Airborne Division in Eindhoven.

During the advance to Eindhoven XXX Corps Troops RE had to build a bridge south of Volkenswaard to relieve congestion on a narrow diversion which had been used to get the leading troops round the demolished bridge on the main road. The next obstacle was the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon (Son), the bridge over which, had been found demolished by 101st US Airborne Division. This was reached on the evening of the 18th, bridging was made easier as, using a civil telephone line passing through German occupied territory, an American Engineer officer with 101st Division had given accurate information about the gap early in the day to Major J Thomas RE, OC 14 Field Squadron RE who passed the information onto the CRE of the Guards Armoured Division, Lieutenant Colonel (later General Sir) Charles 'Splosh' Jones RE (1906-88), who had been appointed to the Division in April 1943. A 100ft Triple Single Bailey was put across the gap by the divisional engineers; they started at 8pm and the first vehicles were moving over at 6am the following morning (19th September). The Germans tried to bomb the bridge on 20th but were unsuccessful.

On the 19th, due to the occupation of the northbound road by the American airborne troops, the advance proceeded rapidly to the southern outskirts of Nijmegen where 82nd US Airborne Division held part of the town, but the enemy still held the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge which had not been demolished.

In a gallant action on the 20th, the American Airborne troops and Guards Armoured Division seized both road and railway bridges intact. The Americans took the road bridge from the north, their assault troops crossing to the left flank under heavy fire in assault boats, borrowed from the Royal Engineers of the Guards Armoured Division and operated by their own engineers who had never seen the equipment before. The 615th Field Squadron RE assisted by building and operating two close support rafts.

The Guards approaching from the south were the first to occupy it. With their leading tanks was the reconnaissance officer (Captain (later Major General) AGC Jones RE) of 14th Field Squadron RE who, having cut any visible wires and made a hurried investigation, reported the bridge safe. (Dutch partisans had very bravely cut some of the detonation wires prior to the arrival of the Guards). A troop from the Field Company was sent up and during the evening disconnected and removed the charges though much worried by German snipers hiding in the girders. Many of these were "winkled out" and with others, less brave, who had been hiding in and under the bridge, constituted a Royal Engineers bag of 82 prisoners. Thus this huge reinforced concrete bridge over the River Waal, and one of the most important in western Europe, was in the Allies hands.

The responsibility for maintaining the captured road and rail bridges at Nijmegen fell to 15 (Kent) GHQ Troop Engineers. To protect the bridge piers from enemy attack they built booms across the river with improvised local materials, but these proved inadequate as German frogmen managed to attack and damage them. To provide more protection 15 (Kent) GHQ Troop Engineers built booms in a horseshoe shape around each of the piers. They were assisted in the construction of the booms by a Dutch tug and its crew, but were hampered by enemy action, their worst day was 4th October when the unit suffered 36 causalities from enemy shelling.

They also repaired the roads on the 'island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem and ran a couple of Class 9 close support rafts and storm boat ferries across 1,100yds of the River Waal, where the current ran at 2½-4 knots. One of the close support rafts was almost exclusively used by XXX Corps Commander, General Horrocks and the crews vied for the best time across - the record, with the river running at 3 knots, was 2½ minutes from time of driving on to time of driving off.

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XXX Corps advance to Arnhem (22-25 September 1944)

After securing Nijmegen XXX Corps pushed northwards towards Arnhem, but soon ran into determined opposition, and German threats to the flanks of the narrow corridor through which the Corps was advancing intensified. As the ground was unsuitable for armour the 43rd (Wessex) Division was brought forward to join the Guards in an effort to reach 1st Airborne Division, now heavily beset in Arnhem.

Encountering strong opposition on the direct route, a column of infantry pushed out to the left and, on the afternoon of the 22nd, reached the river bank at Driel where contact was made with the Polish Parachute Brigade.

As previously mentioned during the night of 23rd/24th September the 204th Field Company RE and the Polish Engineers ferried approximately 200 men of 4th Dorsetsand Polish airborne troops plus much needed stores across to the north bank to reinforce the beleaguered 1st Airborne Division. The operation was jointly organised by Lieutenant Colonel Myers RE and Lieutenant Colonel MCA Henniker OBE MC RE, the CRE of 43rd (Wessex) Division, who, ironically, had until recently been the CRE of 1st Airborne Division.

The sappers were met with heavy enemy fire, a strong current, and casualties to the assault boats on the way up, Henniker later wrote of this operation:

"On the river bank Sappers took the boats and rowed men and supplies across. It was pitch dark. On the far bank were two burning factories illuminating a rising forest of trees that went up from the water's edge. The swirling current drifted the boats downstream on the way back. Men wading in mud and water dragged them back along the water's edge for more trips. The mortar fire eased up a bit but was replaced by automatic fire. Someone had launched a 'DUKW' or amphibious lorry, at the ferry site about 200 yards upstream. As this swirled down across our front a Spandau opened up on it. The man on my right - a sapper corporal - was shot through the head and another on my left got a bullet through his arm, The ferrying went on until daylight. It was a bad night."

The difficulties encountered in this reinforcement attempt made it plain for all to see that it would be impossible to reinforce the airborne troops sufficiently to enable the Arnhem road bridge to be captured and to establish a strong enough bridgehead, so it was decided to evacuate the remnants of 1st Airborne Division within the Oosterbeek Perimeter on the night of 25th/26th September.

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Evacuation of the Oosterbeek Perimeter (25-26 September 1944) - Operation Berlin

The evacuation was carried out on the night 25-26 September by 260th and 553rd Field Companies RE of 43rd (Wessex) Division reinforced by 20th and 23rd Canadian Field Companies RCE all under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Henniker OBE MC RE. His Adjutant was Captain PD Blood RE (1920-2002), a relation of General Sir Blindon Blood, the first modern Chief Royal Engineer.

Henniker held an 'O' Group at 4 pm and it was obvious from the faces of the Field Companies' officers that no one had any doubts about the unpleasant prospects that lay ahead. Nevertheless they departed to instruct their companies and prepare for the night's work. Meanwhile three miles downstream a brigade with pontoons and bridging lorries performed, as a feint, all the evolutions expected for a crossing in force. 553rd Field Company RE constructed a bridge across the canal south of Driel as part of this ruse.

On the north bank, early in the evening, Major Jack Winchester RE and three sappers from 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE marked the evacuation routes from the Oosterbeek defence area across the water-meadows to the river's edge.

At 9.15 pm the evacuation started in pouring rain and pitch darkness only partially illuminated by buildings burning in the distant. The 20th and 23rd Field Companies RCE operated the east ferry sites, whilst 260th and 553rd Field Companies RE operated the west ferry sites. The Royal Engineers manned 16 assault boats (made from canvas with fitted supporting wooden struts, which could be paddled or rowed) and the Canadians manned 21 storm boats (made of wood and powered by an outboard motor which took just three minutes to cross the river). The first boat across was manned by Lieutenant Alan Bevan RE and a couple of sappers. Company Sergeant Major (CSM) FJ Petrie MM RE (553rd Field Company RE) recalls the evacuation:

"My platoon was given the task of taking the first boats across. Normally a crew of two would have been enough but I took three men with me because of the strong winds and the expectation of a swift current...My boat having been made ready for the water was quickly pushed off, the crew paddling side-by-side in a kneeling position with me in the bow. The current immediately took control and within seconds we were swept far downstream. Only by strenuous efforts were we able to set the craft back on line for the far bank... Several times we were hailed by men floating or swimming past, some shouting 'Tommy'. At first I wondered what Germans were doing in the water..." [he then realised that they were from the Polish Parachute Brigade, but could not pick any of them up because of fear of capsizing his boat]"...A large burning building to our left cast sufficient reflected light on the water to show the nearness of the enemy bank and we also then saw flashes and came under automatic fire from straight ahead and above. As soon as the boat grounded we jumped into the water and took cover until the firing stopped... I observed that the land rose steeply from the water's edge and disappeared into a dark mass of trees... Several shapes came into view which I thought must be the enemy: then more optimistically that they were our waiting passengers. Anxious calling brought no response and the figures disappeared..." [it transpired to be nothing but tricks of the light] "... Being concerned at the fact that our craft had been carried downstream we waded back into the river and with some difficulty pushed the boat against the current... until we came across a DUKW (an amphibious vehicle) stranded half on the bank. A quick investigation revealed two soldiers hiding inside. They told us they had been sheltering for some time and that they knew nothing of any other men in the vicinity... The extra weight of the two men and the experienced gained on the outward journey helped us to make a faster return crossing although the current was even stronger..." [and they were subjected to mortar fire] "...On arrival our two passengers quickly disappeared amongst the troops gathered around the ferry point. Several other boats arrived soon after, the paddles of the crews being supplemented by passengers using spades or trenching shovels..." [Petrie, with a fresh crew, made a second crossing but found no more survivors].

After the return of the first boats to the south bank a steady stream of battle weary men wearing airborne style helmets hauled their way across the mud along the line of marker tape to the medics waiting to minister to their needs.

All night long the Sappers toiled backwards and forwards in a current which became swifter as dawn approached and rendered the assault boats almost impossible to handle. But the Canadians with their power-driven storm boats continued even though their boats were temporarily hampered by engine failure. As dawn broke the enemy fire increased. The very last boat across was taken by Lieutenant RJ Kennedy RCE at 5.30 am., nearly ever man aboard was hit by gun fire. Lieutenant Colonel Henniker RE later described the scene:

"As dawn broke grey, the troubles began. There was no flash to advertise the Boche shooting. He interfered more. Each trip became more hazardous. Little fountains marked where the mortar bombs had struck the water, debris of boats and struggling men marked the hits. But no one faltered. The crews of the assault boats were increased from four to six and then to eight to cope with the swifter stream. The Canadians plied their ferries as though on the waters of their own great lakes and rivers . . . There were still some hundred men on the far bank, but our casualties were increasing. A young Canadian officer [Lieutenant RJ Kennedy RCE] took over a load of life-belts (found earlier in a German depot) and left them on the far shore. He made two trips with these, leaving about a hundred for those who cared to use them. Each trip he brought back a boatload of men. In the first trip he had about five casualties. In the second hardly a man got out un hit, many were dead. It was a gallant effort, but he could not be allowed to try again. Some used the life jackets there and then, some used them the next night and some escaped by ways that are stories apart and remain to be told by the men themselves."

The light forced the evacuation to stop as fairly heavy shelling and mortar fire were directed upon the Royal Engineers' vehicles, two suffered direct hits and were burning. The rest were soon pulled out carrying what boats that were retrieved from the river.

During the night 2,163 men of 1st Airborne Division, 160 men of the Polish Parachute Brigade and 75 men of 4th Dorsets were evacuated: few but the wounded, and those already prisoners, were left behind. Five Canadian (from 20th and 23 Field Companies RCE) and four British sappers (from 260th and 553rd Field Companies RE) lost their lives during the evacuation - after the war a memorial to those men was erected on the south bank of the river near the evacuation point. Lieutenant Colonel Henniker OBE MC RE, the CRE of 43rd (Wessex) Division was awarded a DSO for planning and executing the engineering practicalities of the reinforcement and evacuation operations.

The rescued airborne troops were immediately returned to Britain. General Urquhart, who stayed with Field Marshal Montgomery on his way home, was given a letter by Montgomery to be read out to all the airborne troops on his return, it contained the following sentence:

In the years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say: 'I fought at Arnhem'.

Sapper George Needham (1st Parachute Squadron RE), who fought at Arnhem, thought this of the operation:

I don't think any of us realised the seriousness of the position at the time. Every gun which went off - we thought it was XXX Corps coming to relieve us. It was "the biggest balls-up since Mons"; that was a regular saying in our squadron.

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XII Corps advance towards Tilburg (18-25 September 1944)

On the left flank of XXX Corps, 53rd (Welsh) Division of XII Corps made a successful crossing over the Meuse-Escaut Canal at Lommel. The assault was carried out by 158th Infantry Brigade on a two-battalion front, with 555th Field Company RE under command for the construction of two Class 5 rafts. Owing to limited success by the battalion on the right, raft construction could only be carried out on the left. Here the ferry was in operation six hours after zero hour and remained in action till a Class 9 FBE. bridge was erected. Work on the latter was held up and heavy casualties incurred by enemy small arms fire, and construction could not be carried on until an infantry attack had been put in to clear the enemy farther from the site. The bridge was eventually opened to traffic in the late afternoon of 18th September. The site originally selected and planned for a Class 40 bridge was still under close range enemy fire, so a new site was selected. Work on this was started by 282nd Field Company RE with 244th Field Company RE (less two platoons) under command at 11.45 am on the 20th, and completed by 3.30 pm the 21st, using "artificial moonlight" from four searchlights during darkness.

Resistance stiffened as XII Corps advanced northwards and it made slower progress over a number of waterways. By the 25th September it was held up north of the Wilhelmina Canal east of Tilburg.

VIII Corps advance towards Venlo (18-25 September 1944)

On the 18th September VIII Corps on the right of XXX Corps established, with 3rd Infantry Division, a small bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut Canal at Lille St. Hubert. Immediately the Divisional RE started bridging and 246th Field Company RE completed a 160-ft. Class 9 bridge in six hours, losing one officer killed and one wounded in the operation. 17th Field Company RE started work on the construction of a Class 40 bridge, their efforts were shrouded for some hours by a thick mist. In consequence the bridge was finished by 5 pm without the unit sustaining a single casualty.

The advance led by 11th Armoured Division was thus able to be continued without loss of time, forcing its way forward in the next few days across several canals and streams, many of which had to be bridged. Operations Eighth Corps. Normandy to the Rhine, a history of VII Corps by Lieutenant Colonel G. S. Jackson) records that: "The Sappers did wonders in quickly bridging the countless canals and rivers lying in the path of the advance." By the evening of the 25th, VII Corps was across the Zuid Willemsvaart Canal and holding Gemert and St. Antonis.

Other Engineer Unit Activities

Airfield Construction

In mid-September No 12 Airfield Construction Group was regrouped and consisted of No 13 and 15 Airfield Construction Groups and 5357th Airfield Construction Wing RAF. They were tasked with airfield construction in the Arnhem area so that the fields would serve as a base for the Air Force Group which would cover a further advance into Germany.

No 16 Airfield Construction Group (Lieutenant Colonel T Michell RE) was charged with the reconstruction of airfields in the wake of XXX Corps advance northwards to relieve the airborne troops. The airfields identified for the Group's attention were; Eindhoven, Helmond, Uden (Volkel - B80), Heesch (B88) and Grave (B82). The Group consisted of:

• 78 and 689 Road Construction Companies RE
• 269 and 231 Pioneer Companies

The Eindhoven airfield was in commission by 20th September and the following evening the Group's HQ was relocated from Bourg Leopold to Volkel: But there were difficulties as Mitchell later records:

21 September ...Arriving at Uden, I found my recce officer had requisitioned, for 16 Group HQ, the premises of a wealthy local builder who had been arrested and imprisoned by the local Dutch Resistance for collaborating with the Germans. Then down to the Volkel airfield, which had been heavily bombed. It had two brick-paved runaways of 5,000ft and 6,000ft in length, and a large number of reinforced concrete hangers, situated in three widely dispersed locations near the perimeter... 78 Coy had started repairing one of runways...
22 September ... As 78 Coy and the detachment 269 Pioneer Coy were on their way to work on Volkel airfield, they were met by a German patrol...The German fired on them, damaging and immobilizing one vehicle. In the ensuing skirmish, 78 and 269 Coys' troops were able to retreat to Uden without casualty... When they...reached the airfield, they found it occupied by 15 enemy tanks, and came back...

The German's were eventually cleared from the airfield and by 30th September the Group managed to repair one runway at Volkel and lay sufficient taxi track and hard standings for the aircraft of one RAF wing.

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Survey

During the preparation for Operation Market Garden, members of Survey in the UK and France were engaged in up-dating and preparing operational maps for both the airborne and ground forces. This included maps for Rotterdam, which were to be used by the 1st Airborne Division if Operation Market Garden proved to be successful. It was planned that instead of the Division being returned to the UK after the operation it would be re-deployed to capture Rotterdam.

In France the 3rd Field Survey Depot RE was responsible for the map supply of the advancing ground troops and at the time of 'Market Garden' was reinforced with the personnel and transport of two topographical sections and two general survey sections: twenty 3-ton lorries were borrowed from the RASC. At the same time the Base Map Depot RE was reinforced with approximately 100 pioneers and French civilians to help packing and sorting, and a mobile map dump from which formations could draw direct was formed at XXX Corps HQ with three 3-ton lorries and a topographical section of a field survey company.

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Engineer Stores

5 Engineer Stores Base Depot (5 ESBD) was responsible for the provision of engineer stores required by the advancing ground forces.

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Postal

The 1 Airborne Division Postal Unit RE like other support units of the division were deployed to Europe by sea as the 'sea-tail'. The unit arrived in theatre on 17 August 1944 in anticipation of supporting the Division in Operation Comet which was later cancelled.

Each of the ground formations involved in Operation Market Garden had their own postal units. During the advance to Arnhem they were deployed to their respective formation's rear maintenance areas, with instructions to hold mail for the front line troops until it was called forward.

On 21st September the Officer Commanding (OC) Guards Armoured Division Postal Unit RE (Captain J Turver RE) was instructed to "proceed forward with the mail and newspapers" from Bourg Leopold to Grave . His journey north, with a Lance Corporal, in a 15-cwt ton truck was eventful; they were shelled and nearly captured by the Germans. In the late evening they stopped by a Divisional sign to find the following morning (22nd) that it was the Divisional Supply Point. The mail was distributed and before returning to Bourg Leopold Turver was instructed by the Brigadier Q to memorise details which, for security reasons, could not be reported over the radio. As soon as they started to travel south enemy activity forced them to return to the safety of the Divisional Supply Point. They eventually managed to get to Bourg Leopold on the 24th September. Turver later wrote:

I found afterwards the reason that the delivery of mail and newspapers was so urgent it was because the Germans were coming forward to the river bank with their psychological equipment and broadcasting that “This is the first time that you have been without mail – you are cut off”. The delivery of the mail and newspapers clearly showed that the Germans had their facts wrong.

History of the Corps of Royal Engineers Vol IX Pakenham-Walsh RP (Institution of Royal Engineers, Chatham, 1958)

Royal Engineers Journals (March 1946, June 1946, December 1994)

Arnhem 1944 - The Airborne Battle 17-26 September Middlebrook M (Pengiun, 1995)

Great Battles of the British Army as Commemorated in the Sandhurst Companies (1991)

www.bbc.co.uk/history/

www.pegasusarchive.org/

Links to further reading:

Corps History Part 16 - The Corps and the Second World War

Article - Assault Bridging and Equipment

Campaign - Royal Engineers and Operation Overlord

Engineering History - Airborne Sappers

Engineering History - Armoured Engineers

Specialist History - WW2 Army Postal Services